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The Anthropology of Hypostasis

On the Question of the Genealogy of the Subject[1]

Abstract

The article deals with the Greek patristic concept of *hypostasis* which could be conceived as the counter-model of the subject in the history of ontology. Following the Russian philosopher Alexei Chernyakov (1955-2010), we suggest a methodological hypothesis that Heidegger's "pheno-menological destruction" was incomplete, because the metaphysics of eastern Christianity dropped out of the realm of his ontological work (in connection with the core topic of ontological difference). The consequence for the history/genealogy of the subject would be that it is constituted not so much through the "oblivion of Being" as through the "oblivion of hypostasis" (in form of its reification). The article claims that the history of the subject can be portrayed as an interminable clash between the subject and hypostasis. The example of Cappadocian Fathers and the Christological-anthropological analogy of Leontius of Byzantium show that there is a "dereified" concept of hypostasis in the Eastern patrictics which implies the crucial fact that *hypostasis* is irreducible to the

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classical metaphysical notion of subject-substance. It also gives an opportunity of rethinking the ontological structure of human person.

Keywords

Contrary to the claim of the "post-modernist" philosophy that the subject is dead, the recent years have seen its triumphant comeback both in literary and social studies and in philosophy. There have even been calls for launching an "anti-project of subjectivity". That makes the history of the concept of the subject similar in some ways to the history of the concept of God which – after what seemed to be a final verdict by Nietzsche – is resurfacing in the topical discourse on the "post-secular epoch". There can only be one answer to the question "what comes after the subject?": philosophy will cease to be philosophy if it does not reproduce again and again the "functions of subjectivity" (Jean-Luc Marion).

The subject is inevitably present in our thinking about man, personality, the ego. But it is equally obvious that the invention of the figure of the modern subject is preceded by a long history that is riddled with paradox. It begins with the Aristotelian ὑποκείμενον and reaches its conclusion in the figures of the Cartesian *cogito* and the Kantian transcendental subject. To sort out the history of subjectivity, reveal the main stages in the formation of the model of the subject is the leitmotiff and the driving force of the philosophical genealogy of the subject which owes in equal measure to the archaeological method of Foucault and Heidegger's method of phenomenological destruction. To identify the moment of the birth of the subject when the thought of it was only just taking shape, to point to the place of parting of the ways where the choice was made and the bifurcation occurred that led to the oblivion of one aspect of thought in favour of the other. The hunch that such a point of bifurcation exists (and perhaps there are several such points?) informs the majority of post-Heideggerian and post-Foucault studies. They reveal new resources in the history of antique and medieval philosophy and uncover underlying archeological layers of our thought of man.

1.

Alexei Chernyakov (1955–2010)[2] is pursuing his project of the genealogy of subjectivity under the slogan "In Search of the Lost Subject". His research horizon is determined by Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The "turning point" that occurred in the fate of the subject in *Sein und Zeit* (*SuZ*), enables him to raise three questions that provide guiding threads through the labyrinths of subjectivity: 1) what makes the classical subject "classical"; 2) what is the essence of the "overcoming" or "destruction" of the concept of subject in *SuZ*; 3) What or who succeeds the subject in *SuZ*?[3] In my opinion, the second question is pivotal. For it is connected with *Alexei Chernyakov's key methodological hypothesis that Heidegger's "phenomenological destruction" is not complete.*

In his Marburg lectures *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (1927) Heidegger sets a new task for phenomenology, i.e. to become a method of ontology and to work historically with its concepts[4].

That method includes the so-called "phenomenological destruction" which signifies a "critical dismantling" (Abbau) of the concepts we have inherited and which we initially and unwittingly had to apply, a destruction down to the sources from which they had been borrowed[5]. In *SuZ* (§6) Heidegger explains in detail that "destruction" does not mean "annihilation". "But this destruction is just as far from having the *negative* sense of shaking off the ontological tradition. We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its *limits*; these in turn are given factically in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is

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2   The following publications give an idea of the project: А.Г. Черняков, В поисках утраченного субъекта, *Метафизические исследования. Т. 6 (1998),* с. 11–38; А.Г. Черняков, *Онтология времени. Время и бытие в философии Аристотеля, Гуссерля и Хайдеггера*. (СПб.: ВРФШ, 2001); English translation: Alexei Chernyakov, *The Ontology of Time. Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger.* (Phaenomenologica 163, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002); A. Chernyakov, Heidegger and "Russian Questions" (Russia and Phenomenological Tradition. Proceedings of the International Conference. September 14th–17th, 2005. St.-Petersburg: St. Petersburg School of Religion and Philosophy, 2005), p. 22–36; А.Г. Черняков, Хайдеггер и русские вопросы (Историко-философский ежегодник' 2006. М.: Наука, 2006), с. 305–319; А.Г. Черняков, Хайдеггер и персонализм русского богословия, (Персональность. Язык философии в русско-немецком диалоге [Научный сборник], под ред. Н.С. Плотникова и А. Хаардта при участии В.И. Молчанова, М.: Модест Колеров, 2007), с. 139–148; А.Г. Черняков, В поисках основания онтологии: субъект или ипостась? (Ежегодник по феноменологической философии. Т. 1 (2008), М.: ИД РГГУ, 2008), с. 237–261.
3   А.Г. Черняков, *Онтология времени*, с. 263.
4   Martin Heidegger*, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.* GA 24 (Frankfurt a.M.: V. Klostermann, 1989), S.27.
5   Ibid. S. 31

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thus bounded off (*SuZ*, 22)"[6]. Alternatively Heidegger describes his method as "Auflockerung der verhärteten Tradition", a "loosening of the ossified tradition". The work is primarily *hermeneutic in character,* as it offers a chance of redefining one's attitude to tradition, a chance of knowing oneself. Therefore raising the question of the *genealogy of the subject* within the hermeneutic situation is not only possible but necessary. After all, according to Heidegger, fundamental ontology needs "an ontic foundation" and such foundation is provided by a special being that is at the center of the hermeneutic situation and is called *Dasein.*

Thus, destruction is called upon to outline the methodological tradition "in terms of its positive opportunities". Alexei Chernyakov notes that many of Heidegger's constructs can only be understood if their *apophatic* aspect is preserved. While in the text of *SuZ* the content of the main concepts of existential analytics (fundamental ontology) of *Dasein* is formed through their *juxtaposition* to the key concept of classical ontology ("ontology of the present"), obviously these juxtapositions are not merely illustrations, but they perform a positive and serious meaning-creating function. The link of concepts (when juxtapositions turn out to be indications of sort) is called "negative analogy"[7]. The key negative analogy is that *Dasein* is *not the subject.* This prompts the task of identifying positive opportunities of the metaphysical tradition of thought about the subject or "phenomenological destruction" of the concept of the subject.

In the 1930s Heidegger, as is known, abandoned the project of fundamental ontology in favour of developing a concept of the "history of Being" (*Seinsgeschichte*). However, Alexei Chernyakov believes the decision to have been premature. He thus formulates his methodological hypothesis: *"phenomenological destruction" has been accomplished only partially because the metaphysics of eastern Christianity dropped out of the realm of ontological work (in connection with Heidegger's core topic of ontological difference)[8].* This suggests as one of the most intriguing tasks of modern ontology, viz., a detailed hermeneutic analysis (in the spirit of *SuZ*) of Oriental patristics understood as the speaking of its philosophical-theological language.

Let us give a brief summary of the key points of the phenomenological destruction of the concept of the subject. Wilhelm Dilthey was one of the first to divine that something was wrong with the subject. In his

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[6] M. Heidegger*, Being and Time,* trans. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. (London: SCM Press, 1962.)

[7] А.Г. Черняков, Онтология времени. Гл. IV, § 2.

[8] Cf. in particular: А.Г. Черняков, В поисках основания онтологии: субъект или ипостась? с. 250–251.

Einführung in die Geisteswissenschaften (1883) he wrote: "Running through the veins of the cognizing subject constructed by Locke, Hume and Kant, is not real blood but a diluted juice of reason as sheer thought activity"[9]. Dilthey, on the contrary, suggests putting "man in the entire diversity of his forces" at the foundation of philosophy. However, the use of the word "man" was not fortuitous. It was the result of a long process of "anthropologization of ontology" which was first clearly declared by Heidegger: "Man assumes the role of the genuine and sole subject."[10]

In the Modern Times the "subject" shifts into the circle of concepts of an entirely different provenance: *ego cogitans, ego, consciousness, reason, spirit, etc.,* even though "initially there is no obligatory conceptual link between 'subjectivity' and selfhood of 'man' who exists in one way or another for himself." The subject in its history reveals two formal features. The first goes back to Aristotle and Aristotelianism. Sub-jectum is an exact Latin copy of the Greek ὑπο-κείμενον (sub-lying). Up until the late Middle Ages it includes two aspects, the ontological and the logical: 1) "to be one-in-many", making the presence of a thing possible in the diversity of its definitions, and 2) to allow the thing to be present for knowledge as a certain entity. Any such subject as a substance (stone or wood) is a subject of its essential and extraneous definitions.

The second formal feature takes shape in the "long Middle Ages": the subject is defined *in relation to the object* as *the condition of the possibility* of the latter. Alexei Chernyakov turns to *Disputationes Metaphysicae* by Francisco Suárez. "What is present as the subject of knowledge as distinct from the act of cognition on the one hand and the thing cognized on the other hand, was described as *conceptus objectivus* or simply *objectum*. In Scholasticism the 'objective' has a meaning opposite to the current word usage (in which 'objective' means 'independent of cognition', 'existing in itself'). Ob-jectum is what ob-jects the intellect as understandable for the intellect and understood by intellect in the concept as 'thrown before' (derived from ob-jicio) and pre-lying as distinct from sub-lying (sub-jectum)". Descartes uses the terms subjectum and objectum in the same meaning. Objective existence means existence *for the intellect*[11]. Therefore for Descartes the ego as the absolute subject (the subject of cogitations) coexists with another, more traditional concept of the subject. Furthermore, the subject also possesses a logical and not ontological primacy. Alexei Chernyakov finds in Kant "the ontological solution" that

[9] В. Дильтей, Введение в науки о духе, (Собр. соч. в 6 тт., Eds. A.V.Mikhailov and N.S.Plotnikov. Т. 1. М.: ДИК, 2000), с. 274.

[10] М. Хайдеггер, Европейский нигилизм, *Время и бытие: Статьи и выступления*, transl. from the German by V.V.Bibikhin (М.: Республика, 1993), с. 118.

[11] А.Г. Черняков, В поисках основания онтологии: субъект или ипостась? с. 244.

has led to the identification of the ego and subjectivity. Alexei Chernyakov thus comments on it: "The ego as *substantia cogitans* becomes the absolute subject *because* all my ideas (and all the ideas are mine) are my *definitions. To have* definitions or predicates is for the thinking substance to *know about them.* And on the contrary, everything that is represented in the perception… is a definition of the thinking ego. Subjectivity is determined through the ego and the ego is determined through subjectivity"[12]. Thus the Kantian interpretation of the Cartesian cogito became an epoch-making moment in the history of ontology.

In general the course of destruction is reminiscent of Heidegger's. However, as has been said earlier, Alexei Chernyakov is interested in the omitted moments in the history of the subject, the bifurcations of thought to which one apparently can return only by following through the royal road of European metaphysics to its end. The proposal to include within the ontological realm the metaphysics of Eastern Christianity leads us to the "doctrine of energies", one of the main topics of Alexei Chernyakov's reflections. As distinct from the Western scholastic metaphysics, the patristic tradition specially develops the "verbality of Being" ("глагольность бытия"). While according to the Western tradition, the individual, including the "individual of reasoning nature" = "personality" (on this definition of Boethius see below) possesses this or that *modus existendi, inasmuch as* it becomes the subject of a certain totality of external definitions (accidences), in the East the method or mode of existence (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως) is linked in the "main" ontological sense with *certain* energies, that are idiomatically revealed in hypostasis (but originate in essence).

In this context the concept of hypostasis as a metaphysical concept that has played the key role in theological Trinitary arguments is reactualized. The use of that concept to distinguish in God three essentially unified hypostases, according to Alexei Chernyakov, could rely only on cognizing "'a mode of existence' that is different and avoids the concept of matter and seeks to grasp the existence (ὕπαρξις) in its 'verbality', to understand it as reality – efficacy-activity or to use the Greek notion, *energy,* or rather the combination of energies"[13]. This course of thought is ultimately traced to Aristotelian metaphysics and its principle of form manifesting itself in the existing individual thing. However, patristics excludes matter from this construction while energy becomes a "key concept not reducible to anything". The real manifestation of the universal nature (manifestation of a fullness that Aristotle described as the second entelecheia) is an

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[12] Ibid. See also: А.Г. Черняков, *Онтология времени,* с. 269–278.
[13] А.Г. Черняков, В поисках основания онтологии: субъект или ипостась? с. 251.

ontological event that the eastern fathers, seeking to avoid the hylemorphic scheme expressed in the following way: to manifest itself, to be present in the sense of the Greek verb ὑπάρχειν, nature must acquire a hypostatic being, it must be enhypostasised[14]. Thus hypostasis means "nature in the state of existence and not merely the possibility of achieving existence". Moreover, Alexei Chernyakov maintains that hypostasis is thought of as a single source of "*certain energies".* The motive behind the study is clear: to articulate the verbality of Being, sought by Heidegger, through a "discourse of energies". The most interesting pages in the article "В поисках основания онтологии" ("In Search of a Foundation of Ontology") are devoted to an attempt to reveal the *energetic character of the hypostasis* through the analysis of the metaphysical language of Maximus the Confessor and St. John of Damascus, however that research project was not pursued further for a variety of reasons.

2.

Alexei Chernyakov's hypothesis about the incomplete character of Heidegger's phenomenological destruction and indeed the whole project of the genealogy of subjectivity have interesting parallels in the French history of philosophy (with emphasis on medieval studies) based on 1) the phenomenological tradition (Jean-Luc Marion) and on 2) Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy (Alain de Libera).

Thus we can talk about the *critique of the onto-theological hypothesis of Heidegger that proceeds from Heidegger himself.* Modern scholars (like Vincent Carraud or Emmanuel Falque)[15] working with archives are discovering forgotten features of the subject which in the future would constitute the key concept of *Dasein*, above all the key feature of openness. This fact suggests at least two conclusions: 1) Heidegger's onto-theological hypothesis is criticized and rejected with regard to medieval thought; 2) the method of phenomenological destruction is used, and the historical-being (in the meaning *Geschichte des Seins*) model of Heidegger's history of philosophy (metaphysics) is abandoned in favour of "fundamental analytics of *Dasein*".

It is about the hermeneutic structure of thought or archive quests that could be designated with the words "thinking with Heidegger against Heidegger" or "overcoming Heidegger through Heidegger". This

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14 Ibid., c. 252.
15 Cf. Emmanuel Falque*, Métamorphose de la finitude, Essai philosophique sur la naissance et la résurrection* (P.: Cerf, 2004); *Dieu, la chair, et l'autre. D'Irénée à Duns Scot* (P.: PUF, 2008); Vincent Carraud, *L'invention du moi* (Paris: PUF, 2010).

hermeneutic structure precisely reproduces Heidegger's thought: metaphysics has moved in the direction of "forgetting of Being", but now in order to rescue the "thinking of Being" it is necessary to return to the starting point and continue moving in the "right direction".

In order to understand the concept of hypostasis in the language of phenomenological philosophy and represent "energy" as the fundamental ontological character of "factical life", Alexei Chernyakov has to turn to the "discourse of energies" as found in Maxiums the Confessor and St. John of Damascus. In other words, he has attempted to "reinstate" the tradition that has been "overlooked" by the chief philosopher of the XX century although it might have become a key resource for his thought. I believe that in spite of the substantive contradictions (an attempt to "personalize" the principle of energy and to make hypostasis "the source" of energy), Alexei Chernyakov's hypothesis *retains its relevance at the formal level.* It is unlikely that a patrologist would appreciate the idea of building bridges from Heidegger to the patristic tradition: there are grounds for believing that *Dogmengeschichte* can do without such an exercise. But the opposite criticism is also possible: the study of the history of theology is often reduced to the study of dogmatic formulas and in general the formal language of this or that epoch. The question suggests itself: is it indeed the case that precise philological analysis of concepts is the sole research method?

In this part of the article I would hazard *to continue moving in the direction set by Alexei Chernyakov.* Namely, to consider in more detail the question "the subject or hypostasis?" in the concept of Trinitarian or Christological theology with particular attention to the philosophical anthropology of the VI century religious author Leontius of Byzantium. The new European philosophy (or the new European metaphysics of subjectivity) after Descartes which turned the subject into *fundamentum absolutum et inconcussum veritatis*, ultimately arrives at what I would describe as a *truncated concept of the subject.* Obviously Heidegger's scenario needs to be revised. The task facing philosophical thought on the subject "after Heidegger" (like the history of philosophy understood philosophically and not doxographically) consists in tracing the details of conceptual transformations and spelling out the philosophical chronology of the birth of the subject. The discovery of "blind spots" in the thought on the subject offers a chance to restore the totality of the "truncated subject", perhaps through discarding it in the concept of personality/hypostasis.

During the course of archeological search of the point of bifurcation, the question "*Who turned a subject into a person?*" is transformed into a different question: *"Who turned a person into a subject?"* Alain de Libera, professor of Western History of Theology at École pratique des hautes études and Professor of Medieval Philosophy at Geneva University, in his book *Naissance du sujet* (the first part of the historical-philosophical trilogy *Archéologie du sujet*)[16] also hints that philosophical chronology of the birth of a subject would be incomplete if it lacked a chapter devoted to hypostasis. Alain de Libera is working on a project of the "archeology of the subject" which he presents as a "critical post-Foucault reading of Heidegger's thesis on the invention of the subjectivity"[17]. This "archeo-logical therapy" is called upon to indicate how the fundamental equation subject = agent (= Ego) is formed. The author tries to trace at what point in the history of subjectivity in the thought construct named *subjectum* passive meaning was replaced by active meaning: at what moment the subject *hypokeimenon*, which is the "basis" for predicates, became the modern subject of thought and action.

To demonstrate the process of the formation of the fundamental equation or the *chiasme de l'agence* subject = agent (= Ego), the French scholar introduces two "theoretical schemes".

1) **attribution** ↔ **inherence**

$\updownarrow$ $\updownarrow$

action ↔ **denomination**

2) **subject** ↔ **hypostasis**

$\updownarrow$ $\updownarrow$

substance ↔ **person**

The first has to do with various modes of the Latin concept *subjectum*, and the interrelated second one expresses the transition from subjectness to subjectivity. De Libera believes that the scheme is valid beginning from the philosophy of the early Middle Ages and ending with phenomenology[18]. It

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16 Alain de Libera*, Naissance du sujet (Archéologie du sujet I)* (P.: Vrin, 2010. 2ème éd.)
17 Alain de Libera, *Naissance du sujet*, p. 25. De Libera also speaks of the "archeology of knowledge" contemplated in terms of the "history of Being".
18 Ibid., p. 90. He stresses that he is not working with concepts but with networks (*réseau*) of concepts.

is the second scheme that is particularly interesting in the context of the *question of hypostasis or person* as an alternative model of the subject.

One of De Libera's tasks is to correct Heidegger's scenario of the birth of the subject (until Decartes and the classical epoch). According to the author of *SuZ*, the main novelty introduced by Descartes was the proposition that the *subjectum*, identical to the *substans* of the scholastics (in the sense of something stable, constant and "real") is the foundation of any psychology of the subject. Thus is effected a transition from *subjectum* to the *ego* and from subjectivity to the Kantian principle of *Ichheit*. However, if one considers the problem in terms of genealogy of the subject/subjectivity it turns out that medieval thought was for a long time marked by a specific chiasm (crisscrossing or reverse parallelism). More precisely, there was a theory of the ego (= theory of the subject in the philosophical meaning of the term *mens*), in the Middle Ages, but it did not require an addition in the shape of the concept of *subjectum*. In other words, the grammatical, logical and metaphysical meanings of the concept did not apply to the sphere of the teaching on the soul. The theory of *mens* in the literal sense did not need support of the concept of *hypokeimenon*, on the contrary, the theory of *subjectum* did not imply the teaching on *mens*. At the same time they intersected and were articulated seven hundred years before the Cartesian formula *ego cogitans.*

It is important to know that de Libera (like Heidegger and the majority of contemporary Western historians of philosophy) *works chiefly with the archive of Latin patristics and scholastics).* The idea of subjectivity has two poles. On the one hand, it is St Augistin's model of the human soul in *De Trinitate*, partly based on *perichoresis* (*circumincessio*, communication) of Divine Personae, and partly on the neo-Aristotelian concept of hypostasis. The translation (substitution of the Greek concept of hypostasis with the Latin word *persona* (see below) became, according to de Libera, an epoch-making event not only for *Latinitas*, but for the entire history of thought. On the other hand, several hundred years later the non-trinitarian averroistic model of subjectivity based on Aristotelian *hypokeimenon* came into play. The second legitimization of *subjectum* effected by Aquinatus (notwithstanding the Augustinian ban on the use of the concept of *hypokeimenon* in the context of persons among themselves) becomes – several centuries before Descartes – a reference point or "epistemic foundation" on which the theory of man as subject-agent is consistently built.

The key methodological question is under what circumstances did the theological concept of persona (a Latin translation of the Greek

πρόσωπον) find its way into the realm of philosophical anthropology?[19] The starting point is usually considered to be Boethius's definition of person/personality: *naturae rationabilis individua substantia (Contra Eut.* Cap. 3), individual substance of intelligent nature. Boethius stresses that his definition simply reproduces in Latin what the Greeks call ὑπόστασις. Many modern authors believe that this is the beginning of the concept of a subsisting thinking subject with which phenomenological philosophy eventually breaks.

Alain de Libera, like the authors considered above, also turns to Heidegger's critique of the subject as presence. Heidegger has this to say of the interpretation of the person by Scheler which matches that of Husserl on the issue: "For Scheler, the person is never to be thought of as a Thing or a substance; the person 'is rather the *unity* of living-through [Er-lebens] which is immediately experienced in and with our Experiences – not a Thing merely thought of behind and outside what is immediately Experienced'. The person is no Thinglike and substantial Being. Nor can the Being of a person be entirely absorbed in being a subject of rational acts which follow certain laws" (*SuZ*, 47). Thus, Heidegger stresses that *a person is not a thing, not a substance, not an object.* Indeed, the present-day phenomenological concept of the person rejects the model of *psychic subsystems,* which allegedly determined the range of scholastic problems from Boethius to Thomas Aquinas and was later assimilated by the philosophy of the modern times.

Heidegger's onslaught on Descartes follows the same lines: the concept of *res cogitans* "substantivates the subject", the soul, consciousness, spirit and personality turn into something "present" *(vorhanden)*, "substantial being". The analysis of the person is thus confined to the relationship of the present subject and present object (that might be considered as the relationship of the ego to things inside the world) ignoring the intentional structure of the subject[20]. The person is what performs intentional acts. In the phenomenological (essentially Schelerian) perspective, any psychic objectivisation is reduced to depersonalisation. For psychic being has nothing in common with personal being (*SuZ*, 48). The juxtaposition of the psyche and intentionality, the object and the act, must, according to Heidegger, put an end to the predominance of the paradigm of substantiality and "substantivating" interpretation of personality or subject.

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19 Ibid., p. 88.
20 Heidegger is convinced that scholasticism ignores intentionality: "… die Scholastik kennt die Lehre von der Intentionalität nicht" (GA 24, S. 81).

Thus, phenomenology opposes traditional ontology, both medieval scholasticism and modern philosophy. In reality the purport of *SuZ* is even more radical: not only the critique of the model of subject-substance ("reification"), but an attack on the entire "traditional anthropology" with its Graeco-Christian roots. According to Heidegger, it consists of two parts that are definitions: 1) "living creature endowed with reason" and 2) "created in God's image". Human being cannot be arrived at as a result of the summation of body, soul and spirit, modes of being that themselves need clarification. "The two sources which are relevant for the traditional anthropology – the Greek definition and the clue which theology has provided – indicate that over and above the attempt to determinate the essence of 'man' as an entity, the question of his Being has remained forgotten, and that this Being is rather conceived as something obvious or 'self-evident' in the sense of the *Being-present-at-hand* of other created Things. These two clues become intertwined in the anthropology of Modern Times where the *res cogitans*, consciousness, and the interconnectedness of experience serve as the point of departure for methodical study. But since even the *cogitationes* are either left ontologically undetermined, or get tacitly assumed as something 'self-evidently' 'given', whose 'Being' is not to be questioned, the decisive ontological foundations of anthropological problematics remain undetermined" (*SuZ*, 49).

But is the above scenario flawless? Has Heidegger really understood *what* has been happening over the centuries within theoretical scheme № 2 ("networks of subjectity", *le réseau de la subjectité*) "subject-hypostasis-substance-person?"[21] The question can be rephrased: is he aware of the magnitude of the implications of including hypostasis in the "network of subjectity"? A negative answer is suggested, among other things, by the fact that Heidegger does not draw any distinctions between ὑπόστασις and ὑποκείμενον[22]. The current scholarly terms "substantivation", "reification" and "hypostasisation" are used as synonyms.

De Libera obviously reproduces what I described earlier as the hermeneutic structure of the historical and philosophical study "to overcome Heidegger through Heidegger". Passage through that structure implies the recognition of two things interconnected under a concessive sentence model: 1) phenomenological destruction must unfold through the destruction of the history of ontology, 2) it has to be admitted however, that there are major blank spots in this story. Thus, the French philosophy historian points to another of Heidegger's fundamental

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21   A. de Libera, *Naissance du sujet*, p. 94.
22   See this idea confirmed in note 2: ibid., p. 94–95

omissions, namely, the fact that he did not fully take into account the language of the late antique and medieval metaphysics.

It is not my purport to analyze the intricate and intriguing historical and philosophical moves, constructions and reconstructions by the supremely erudite de Libera. However, one of his theses is pivotal to our issue of hypostasis as a counter-model of the subject. "If there is anything left that needs more thought in the history of the subject and subjectivity, it is not the oblivion of Being, but the oblivion of hypostasis"[23]. Therefore what is decisive for the history of the subject is not so much reduction of Being to things and the erasure of ontological difference as "reification (substantivation) of hypostasis". "Identifying the subject and hypostasis with substance in the meaning of an (independent) subsisting being, *Vorhandene*, is the basic gesture of the reification of hypostasis". Although it is accomplished by Descartes, one does not find it in St Augustin or in a whole number of medieval authors. Rather the reverse is the case: *"All scholasticism worked on dereification in order to be able to think the mystery of Trinity."*

De Libera comes up with a highly heuristic proposition: the history of the subject can be portrayed as an interminable clash between the subject and hypostasis. In any case one should have put this objection to Heidegger: traditional anthropology is not an anthropology of the reified subject. Rather, *it is determined by the tension between the anthropology of the subject-substance and the anthropology of hypostasis.* There are at least two concepts of the person, one is reified and the other is dereified. Non-recognition of hypostasis in the history of philosophy is matched by dismissal of the philosophy of Neoplatonism and Trinitary theology. That leads to "renunciation of the subject in favour of hypostasis". An important element that is missing in Heidegger's scenario is that "the history of the modern subject is based to a large extent on renunciation of the subject"[24]. Alain de Libera sets himself the task of recovering for the Middle Ages the significance of which they had been stripped by Heidegger by assigning to them a different and worthier place in the history of philosophy. The following might well be the slogan of the archeology of modern subjectivity: "scrupulous theologization of the concept of the subject".

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[23]   A. de Libera, *Naissance du sujet*, p. 95.
[24]   Ibid., p. 97.

Turning to the history of philosophy it is customary to hear the reflections on what is a person as distinct from *res naturalis* (a natural thing), for example, in the philosophy of Descartes or Kant. However, it is usually forgotten that the concept of the person, in all its originality, was introduced by Christian thought and by the Revelation on which that thought thrives. Greek metaphysics was marked by a "fundamental and irreparable limitation: it totally lacked the concept and the very word for personality"[25]. It took for the titanic effort of Cappadocian fathers to *strip the term hypostasis of its former meaning of the subject and bring it closer to the concept of person/personality.* At the same time Maximus the Confessor and St. John of Damascus could hardly have understood the energetic character of the human being without the concept of "enhypostasisation" applied to the interpretation of the God-man personality of Christ and based on *real distinction between hypostasis and nature (substance).* The *anthropology of hypostasis* developed by Leontius of Byzantium, a representative of post-Chalcedonic Christology[26], plays here a key role. So the question of "subject or hypostasis" inevitably involves the examination of the *non-reified concept of hypostasis* in the context of Trinitary and Christological theology. This is not about renouncing philosophical and theological categories as onto-theological narrative, but about trying to reveal their inner transformations in the light of the realities of religious consciousness.

As Heinrich Dörrie points out, "over the centuries ὑπόστασις was an important professional term of philosophy (*ein wichtiges Fachwort der Philosophie*), but it never got a strict definition"[27]. In the context of later antiquity ὑπόστασις was something of a vogue word (*ein Modewort*) in professional philosophical language similar to the term *Existenz* in the philosophical jargon of the mid XX century. Let us try, following the German scholar, to review the milestones in the history of the concept.

Grammatically ὑπόστασις is a verbal noun derived from ὑφίστασθαι, literally "under-stand", "to stand under something", "to take/accept onto

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[25] X. Subiri, *El hombre y Dios* (Madrid, 1984), p. 323.

[26] Stephan Otto, a German specialist on Leontius, expressly describes the distinction between hypostasis and nature as "a new chapter in the history of philosophy" bewailing the fact that "the Chalcedonic Synod has yet to be understood in its significance". See: St. Otto, *Person und Subsistenz. Die philosophische Anthropologie des Leontios von Bysanz. Ein Beitrag zur spätantiken Geistesgeschichte* (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1968), S. 16. I also borrow from Otto the designation of Leontius' teaching on hypostasis as "the philosophical anthropology".

[27] H. Dörrie, *Hypostasis. Wort- und Bedeutungsgeschichte* (Nachrichten von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen 1, 1955), S. 36.

oneself", "to sustain" (German *sich unterstehen*). The main non-philosophical meaning of ὑφίστασθαι is sedimentation of particles in liquids. Accordingly, ὑπόστασις means either the process or the result, the sediment. The philosophical "career" of that word begins in the Hellenistic era. In its dual meaning ὑπόστασις is present in later philosophical idiom: simultaneously as *realization and reality* (*Realisierung und Realität*), and *emergence and existence* (*Entstehung und Bestand*). The scholar also notes the meaning of "manifestation" (*In-Erscheiung-Treten*), as well as the "special being of man and things" (ἰδία ὑπόστασις). Accordingly, ἀνυπόστατον is that which is devoid of a foundation, cannot be realized and "does not attain existence" (*kommt nicht zur Existenz*)[28].

The ontological meanings of ὑπόστασις are formed in the framework of Stoicism. The verb ὑφίστασθαι means transition from a latent to a manifest state. Accordingly, "hypostasisation" is understood as the conversion of primary matter from a substratum devoid of qualities and inaccessible to the senses (ὑποκείμενον) into the subject of qualities and substance (οὐσία) of sensually perceived things under the influence of the *logos*. Dorrie also discovers a juxtaposition of ὑπόστασις and ἐπίνοια as something real and "imputed" with the Middle Stoic Posidonius.

With the Peripatetics of the I and II centuries the term hypostasis acquires a new content: an individual sensually perceived thing of which genera and species "speak". The Aristotelian concept of substance (*ousia*) differed from that of the Stoics in that matter and form were seen as the origins of substance incapable of existence outside individual things. In fact "hypostasis" meant the same thing as the Latin *substantia*, but it was not used formally as a term for the first Aristotelian category. Thus for both Hellenistic schools the link between ὑπόστασις and οὐσία is essential. In both schools hypostasis means something that has a foundation, a manifestation and is sensually definite. But while for the materialistic Stoics ὑπόστασις is above all an *act of realization,* i.e. emergence, for a Peripatetic it is reality, *Bestand*[29].

With the middle Platonists and Neo-Platonists, owing to their negation of the genuine being of individual things and the transfer of essence into the realm of suprasensual, hypostatic (= genuine, ideal) being is opposed to emergence. It is extremely important to note the close link established between the concepts of ὑπόστασις and ἐνέργεια. The supreme (spiritual) principle is realized manifesting itself *in actu*, in activity-reality[30]. The

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[28] "So wurde ὑπόστασις ein Modewort für Realität, Ursprung und Bestand, Existenz und Leben" (H. Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, S. 43).
[29] Ibid., s. 59.
[30] Ibid., s. 69.

supreme divine reality is presented as a *hierarchy of hypostases.* "Hypostasisation" in turn is identical to the transition of ideal being from a latent into a manifest state by reproducing itself in the shape of weaker reflections and likenesses. The supreme existing One as the general foundation of Being is not "hypostasis" because it is not a manifestation of anything[31].

Dörrie's presentation of the history of the concept of ὑπόστασις comes to an abrupt stop with Athanasius the Great, a representative of Nicaean theology. In the polemic with subordinationism of the Arians he refrains from introducing a step hierarchy in divine being and coordinates hypostases with one another. The result of his theological activity was cast in the formula: μία γὰρ ἡ θειότης καὶ εἷς θεὸς ἐν τρίσιν ὑποστάσεσιν (*De incarnatione et contra Arianos*, Migne PG 26, 1000b). It would, however, be odd to believe, along with Dörrie, that the history of the formation of the concept of hypostasis ends with Athanasius[32]. Obviously the study needs the addition of yet another chapter devoted to the Cappadocian fathers and the transformation of the concept of hypostasis in Chalcedonian and post-Chalcedonian Christological theology.

The terminology of Athanasius is diffuse and lacking in order: while in the polemic with the Arians he asserts the above formula, in other places (for example, in *Epistula ad Afros episcopos*, PG 26, 1036, 20) he effectively identifies the concepts of οὐσία and ὑπόστασις[33]. The word usage that has prevailed in church dogma is connected above all with the theological activities of Basil the Great and the Cappadocian circle. In Eastern theology, beginning from the III century (Origen) the concept of hypostasis was used in diverse meanings, in the context of the teaching on Trinity signifying sometimes the distinction of the Three Persons and sometimes their essential unity. The uncertainty stemmed from a lack of clear terminological differentiation of "hypostasis" (Lat. *substantia*) and

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[31] The following fragment from the treatise by Plotinus "On Three Main Hypostases" (V.1.3.7–11) is an example in point. The title, provided by Porphirius, the publisher of *Enneads*, uses the term hypostasis which is very vague as used by Plotinus. "Soul… is an image of the Intellectual-Principle: reason uttered is an image of the reason stored within the soul, and in the same way soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle: it is even the total activity (ἐνέργεια), the entire stream of life sent forth by that Principle to the production of further being (εἰς ἄλλου ὑπόστασιν); it is the forthgoing heat of a fire which has also heat essentially inherent. But within the Supreme we must see energy not as an overflow but in the double aspect of integral inherence with the establishment of a new being (ὑφισταμένην)" (trans. by Stephen MacKenna & B.S. Page).

[32] H. Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, S. 82.

[33] See for example: O. Bardenhewer*, Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur.* Band III (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1912), S. 56.

"essence" (οὐσία, Lat. *substantia, essentia*)[34]. It was Basil the Great who played the decisive role in Trinitarian arguments by being the first to attempt to overcome the extremes of Arianism and Savellianism through rigorous terminological distinction between "hypostasis" and "essence".

There is much to be said for thus interpreting the formula μία οὐσία – τρεῖς ὑποστάσεις consistently adhered to by Basil the Great and other Cappadocians: "one and single divine being in three manifestations"[35] emphasizing the unfolding of the one Divinity (true, not with regard to the world but within the Trinity itself). At the same time Gregory of Nazianzus equates "hypostasis" as a "mode of existence" (τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως) to "person" which was an approximation to the terminology of the Western Fathers *(persona).* The expression was used to stress the real differences between Persons as revealed in their qualities (ἰδιότητες χαρακτηρίζουσαι, ἐξαίρετα ἰδιώματα). The Son is born of the Father, the method of the exodus of the Holy Spirit remains unarticulated and the Father, identified with Divinity (communicates the fullness of his nature to the two other persons or hypostases).

The concept of ὑπόστασις, which with Basil stresses "own being" can well be related to the Aristotelian οὐσία. However, Aristotle himself sometimes uses the word in quite different meanings. Thus πρώτη οὐσία in *Metaphysica* is not identical to πρώτη οὐσία, that crops up in *Categoriae*. The latter expresses individual independent being. In that sense one can speak of an individual man or horse. With Cappadocians hypostasis occupies the latter position. It is conceived as a "concrete mode of existence". On the other hand, a term was found to express the nature common to all the Persons. That meaning was conveyed by οὐσία (or δεύτερα οὐσία in Aristotle's *Categoriae*) understood as genera and species. It is what permits us to speak for example, about many people bearing different names as "man". The essence, representing a general name makes it possible to understand individuals as such. Thus, the terminological differences between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις correspond to the distinction between "the general" and "the particular", κοινόν and ἴδιον (cf. Basil. Magn. *Ep. 38*). However, it cannot be said that "hypostasis" is the same as "the individual", nor can one replace the "essence-hypostasis" relationship with the "subject-extraneous qualities"

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[34] The shades of the words οὐσία and ὑπόστασις and the problem of translating them into Latin are analyzed by Alain de Libera in the context of the reading of Augustin's *De Trinitate*: A. de Libera, *Naissance du sujet*, p. 90, 212 ff., 299 ff. In Russian the still relevant analysis is found in the book: В.Н. Лосский, *Очерк мистического богословия Восточной Церкви. Догматическое богословие* (М., 1991), с. 41–42.

[35] See: *Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte.* Band I von Carl Andresen (Göttingen, 1988), S. 198–206.

relationship. For it is obvious that God cannot, in the strict sense, substitute in the same way as substance does.

The Trinitary theology undoubtedly was a scandal for philosophy. Father George Florovsky aptly remarks in this connection: "For St. Basil, this opposition is only formal and logical. It is true that the examples he uses to elucidate his thought seem to entail division, and not merely distinction, and it is questionable that the three Divine hypostases can be strictly compared to three men. The basis of the theological problem is not the fact that the three hypostases must be enumerated but the fact that these Three are united in One God. It is necessary not only to demonstrate the hypostatic nature and ontological stability of the distinctions within the Trinity, but first of all it must be shown that these are the forms of a single Divine Being. The concept hypostasis must be delimited not only from 'mode' or 'person' in the Sabellian sense but also from 'individual'"[36].

The Cappadocians named Persons designating their attitude to one another, σχέσις (for example, Greg. Nyss. *Or. 29*). Thus the name of the Father is the name not of Essence or Energy but of a relationship: none of the Three Persons can be understood outside the relationship to the Two others, either in the logical or ontological sense. Positing the person of Father as the source of the Trinity rather than the Divine Being, they conferred ontological primacy on the Person with its concrete mode of being over essence. As regards human being, classical Greek philosophy considered nature (the general) to be more important than individual objects (individuals). All the natural characteristics of the human nature – such as divisibility and consequently the possibility of death – constitute the essence of "man", answer the question "what" and accordingly refer to all the human creatures. There is nothing unique about that. But the question "how?" presupposes a person that is "the image and likeness of God". The attitude to the Divine Person does not mean transformation into God (which is impossible owing to the difference of natures), but life in accordance with His "mode of being". Thus, as conceived by Cappadocians, man is called upon to liberate himself from the need of his own nature and to behave as if his person were free of natural laws (= asceticism). The distinction between nature and person as a mode of being (and accordingly, the conversion of a concept of Person/Personality into an ontological concept) was a revolutionary step in philosophy that had *far-reaching anthropological consequences.*

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[36]   Г.В. Флоровский, *Восточные Отцы IV в.* Reprint (М., 1992), c. 80.

The ontology of Leontius of Byzantium[37] is based on *the Cappadocian thesis on the distinction between hypostasis and nature understood in the context of Christological-anthropological analogy.* Leontius is seen as an important witness to Christological arguments in the East during the post-Chalcedonian century (cf. the assessments by A. A. Grillmeier and M.D. Dauling). Of the works belonging to Leontius of Byzantium I will dwell only on his first book *Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos* in which Leontius, following the Aristotelian traditions, argues that the general is present in the particular in a perfect and not a particular way[38].

The aim of Leontius was to defend the Chalcedonian dogma (two natures and one hypostasis) and assert the idea of the unity of Divine and human natures in the person (hypostasis) of Christ while avoiding both the external or accidental idea of the unity (like in Nestorianism) and the idea of a unity that abolishes individual qualities of each of the natures being combined in Eutychianism).

Leontius's main metaphysical principle is οὐκ ἔστι φύσις ἀνυπόστατος (*Contra Nest. et Eutych.* col. 1280A), "there is no nature without hypostasis"[39]. The term οὐσία, "essence" has with Leontius the same meaning as φύσις, "nature" or εἶδος, species. Leontius rejects the reality of universalia and maintains that essence cannot exist without its manifestations in certain hypostases, which actually amounts to the

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[37] We have no accurate data on the biography of Leontius. Leontius is thought to have been born in the last quarter of the V century and to have received a good education. At a certain point in time he became one of the brethren of a Palestinian Monastery (the New Lavra?) where he displayed outstanding ability in the field of theology. He came to Constantinople in 531 together with the mission of the Rev. Sava. Leontius also took part in the 536 Synod which ended with the defeat of the Monophysites. According to the authoritative opinion of D. Evans (D. Evans*, Leontius of Byzantium: An Origenist Christology.* (Washington, 1970)), all the three treatises of Leontius (*Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos*, *Capita Triginta contra Severum*, *Epilysis*) were published in Constantinople between 540 and 543. Leontius died in 543, the year when the famous Edict of Justinian against Origen was issued. This dating is based on the hypothesis put forward by Friedrich Loofs (F. Loofs*, Leontius von Byzanz und die gleichnamigen Schriftsteller der griechischen Kirche.* (Leipzig, 1887)), the first student of the work of Leontius, to the effect that Leontius was the very Origenic monk who is mentioned by Cyril of Scythopolis in *The Life of St Sava.*

[38] I will not touch upon the problem of the relationship between the two Leontiuses, Leontius of Byzantium and Leontius of Jerusalem. The authorship of Leontius of Byzantium was never challenged with regard to three works: *Three books against Nestorians and Eutychians* (*Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos 1–3*) // PG T. 86. Col. 1268–1396; *Thirty Chapters Against Severum* (*Capita Triginta contra Severum*) // PG T. 86. Col. 1901–1916; *Resolution of Severum Arguments* (*Epilysis* or *Solutio argumentorum a Severo objectorum*) // PG T. 86. Col. 1916–1945.

[39] Cf. Rev Maximus the Confessor: "When they say that there is no nature that is not hypostasized, they are right..." (*ThPol* 23, PG 91, 264A).

principle that "there is no nature without hypostasis". According to Leontius, all the individual beings are hypostasis idiomatically revealing some οὐσία or φύσις. However, that does not mean that hypostasis can be the manifestation of only one nature. The word may point to individual beings containing two different natures so that different natures coexist in communication in being and each nature is identified not by itself, but in connection with the other one. Such a link of natures in one hypostasis occurs in the case of man (body and soul) and in Divine Incarnation (Divinity and Humanity).

The thesis on the distinction between hypostasis and nature enabled Leontius to interpret the hypostasis of Logos differing from the two natures as the embodiment of the idioms of the two natures different in their eidos. Apparently this is what the notorious teaching of "en-hypostasisation", often thought to be the distinctive feature of Leontius's philosophy, boils down to. In reality it is nothing if not "the application of the axiom of independence (*Selbstand*) of concrete entity and *real distinction between nature and hypostasis* (my italics)"[40].

The work of neo-Platonic commentators of Aristotle in the V and VI centuries which on the one hand, trace the origin to the Cappadocian teaching of "idioms", distinct features of the single being, were the decisive factor in the emergence of a new concept of person. Starting with *Isagoge* by Porphirius, the question was whether personal being refers to accidental or substantial orders. That meant that none of the three Divine hypostases could be regarded as an accidental quality of the Divine nature while not being a substantive being in itself. However, with respect to Christological problems, hypostatic being meant not only "idiomatic certainty", but independent being. According to Leontius, ὑπόστασις, hypostasis (or πρόσωπον, person, a term rarely used by Leontius)[41] is concrete unity cognized through certain characteristics. To be a hypostasis means not to be an "accidental quality" (συμβεβηκός, *accidens*), i.e. not to be what cannot have an independent existence ("whose being is contemplated in another and not in himself").

This is the meaning of the oft-quoted phrase: καὶ ἡ μὲν ὑπόστασις πρόσωπον ἀφορίζει τοῖς χαρακτηριστικοῖς ἰδιώμασι, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπόστατον τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸ συμβεβηκὸς δηλοῖ ὃ ἐν ἑτέρῳ ἔχει τὸ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἐν

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[40] St. Otto, Person und Subsistenz, S. 54.

[41] Dörrie notes that after the Chalcedonian synod of 451 the words ὑπόστασις and πρόσωπον have been fully interchangeable (H. Dörrie, *Hypostasis*, S. 83).

ἐαυτῷ θεωρεῖται (Col. 1277D3)[42]. If hypostasis reveals singleness, "enhypostasisation refers to essence. The mode of existence, the *logos* which is characteristic of hypostasis is τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἶναι or τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ὑπάρχειν. Thus hypostasis exists "in its own right", "by itself" wherein lies its difference from nature[43].

Obviously, Aristotelian hylemorphism is unsuited for demonstrating what constitutes man's being as a person, something other than either the nature of the body or the nature of the soul. Matter seen as *principium individuationis* of man could explain only the corporeal features. But the ontological novelty of the person does not fit into this scheme. Leontius cites the example of a burning light which is a unity of wood and fire (1304 B1–1304C7). Here, two different natures combine not in "another eidos" which would mean that they lose their inherent hyparxis[44]. For each of them remains "that very fire" and "that very tree" but they are united in hypostasis.

From this flows *the theory of hypostasis as the point of intersection of "henotic" and "diacritical" functions, the "unity" and the "difference".* Not only nature can act as the principle of unity ἕνωσις, hypostasis also is capable of "uniting" if natures of different types come together in it. For hypostasis is not individual being within an identical species, but "being one in number it retains distinctions of natures existing in their own way in the identity of unity"[45].

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[42] "Hypostasis defines a person by characterizing idioms and enhypostaton indicates that it is not the accidental that has a being in the other and is not contemplated in itself".

[43] Col. 1305C10 – the terms ἄτομον and ὑποκείμενον are also used to refer to hypostasis. Although Leontius writes that he is "indifferent" to what concept is used and by whom, it is clear that hypostasis is far removed from the Aristotelian substratum determined by form. It looks as if this is the clash between the traditional subject and hypostasis referred to above.

[44] Like St.Gregory of Nyssa (*Contra Eun. I*, 495–497), Leontius distinguishes λόγος ὑπάρξεως and λόγος οὐσίας. Hyparxis is the certainty of ousia, concrete and not universal being (our author uses *terminus technicus* of his time repeating again and again that the general "is described" or "outlined", for example, 1285A).

[45] ἓν εἶναι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἀποδείκνυσι τὸ διάφορον σῴζοντα τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐν τῷ ταυτῷ τῆς ἑνότητος (Contra Nest. et Eutych. PG T. 86. Col.1304B7–9). Cf. Maximus the Confessor: ἡ γὰρ ἕνωσις τὴν διαίρεσιν ἀπωσαμένη τὴν διαφορὰν οὐκ ἐλώβησεν (*Ambigua*, PG 91, 1056 c). It is also notable that hypostasis is again described not by pointing to the existing subject-substance but by pointing to a relationship, σχέσις. Thus in col. 1289A3–11: "Christ acts as the bond between two extreme limits if we mean ourselves and the Father through His parts. He is entirely a hypostasis by comparison with the Father owing to His Divinity and along with His humanity and He is entirely a hypostasis compared with us along with His Divinity and owing to His humanity. The relations of difference and unity of which we know that they are in Him owing to His parts and that apply to the Father and us differ by reason of the link of these parts to the two extreme limits."

Leontius strictly adheres to the Chalcedonian dogma: the Divine and human nature in Divine Incarnation preserves its *hyparxis* and natural qualities. Christ is the perfect God and the perfect man. Thus while within the St Trinity hypostasis has the function of distinction, in the case of the Incarnation of God, like in the case of man "consisting of" the soul and the body, hypostasis essentially (οὐσιωδῶς) unites different natures[46]. This, in a nutshell, is the Christological-anthropological analogy of Leontius[47].

To sum up. While the Trinitary theology of the Cappadocians confirmed the meaning of hypostasis as a "mode of existence" "relationship" of Divine Personae, Leontius's Christology emphasizes, speaking after Vladimir Lossky the fact that "person is not reducible to nature". In accordance with the model of embodied Divine hypostasis Leontius of Byzantium demonstrated the ontological structure of the person. Man as he is cannot be derived from human nature. Therefore only the hypostatic being of man different from both body and soul, can provide grounds for comparing man and God-man.

As Vladimir Lossky stresses, hypostasis answers the question "who?" and not "what?" It would be appropriate to quote the well known extract from Lossky's article: "'Person' signifies the irreducibility of man to his nature — 'irreducibility' and not 'something irreducible" or 'something which makes man irreducible to his nature' precisely because it cannot be a question here of 'something' distinct from 'another nature' but of someone who is distinct from his own nature, of someone who goes beyond his nature while still containing it, who makes it exist as human nature by this overstepping and yet does not exist in himself beyond the nature which he 'enhypostasizes' and which he constantly exceeds. I would have said 'which he ecstacizes,' if I did not fear being reproached for introducing an expression too reminiscent of 'the ecstatic character' of the *Dasein* of Heidegger, after having criticized others who allowed themselves to make such comparisons»[48]. "Desubstantivized" concept of hypostasis which

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[46] Möller writes: "One of the commonplaces in the Christology of diphysites is that theological vocabulary seems to be turned upside down when passing from "theology" to "iconomy" (Ch. Möller*, Le chalcédonisme et le néochalcédonisme en Orient de 451 à la fin du VIᵉ siècle, Grillmeier A., Bacht H. (Hrsg.), *Das Konzil von Chalkedon. Geschichte und Gegenwart, I* (Würzburg, 1951), S. 697.

[47] The problem of anthropological analogy is also discussed in Sergei Chursanov's articles concerning the personalistic approach in modern orthodox theology with reference to V. Lossky, J.D. Zizioulas and Archimandrite Sophrony (Sakharov): С.А. Чурсанов, Христианский образ человека: основные линии православного вероучения, *Церковь и время* 4/49 (2009), с. 165-204; С.А. Чурсанов, Антропологическая аналогия в православной христологии, Церковь и время 1/38 (2007), с. 208-220.

[48] Vladimir Lossky*, The Theological Notion of the Human Person, chapter 6 of *In the Image and Likeness of God.* (St Vladimir's Seminary Press: New York, 1974), p. 120.

implies the difference between hypostasis–human person and his complicated nature leaves open the possibility for ecstasizing and transcendizing of one's own nature.

As I have attempted to show, an elaboration of Alexei Chernyakov's hypothesis reveals important aspects of thought about man (philosophical anthropology) reduced in Heidegger's history of metaphysics as history of the oblivion of being[49]. Instead of the picture of the triumphal march of the subject that is natural and is the master of the world, which ultimately leads to European nihilism, we are offered a chance to replenish the *truncated concept of the neo-European subject* by following the guiding thread of fundamental ontology drawing on the resources not only of the Western but also Oriental (patristic) thought of man. There is no need to be afraid that the hermeneutic effect of such "replenishment" may spring a surprise, including the recognition of illegitimacy of the projection of Heidegger's *Dasein* to the patristic tradition. In any case the relevance of the question "What will come after the subject?" does not go away: the modern world is fashioned according to the template of the subject and although the latter theoretically seems to be ready to surrender its positions renouncing the philosophical claims of the ego to be master of the world, he will hardly succeed in doing so while sidestepping the question of the place of "who-being" and, consequently, without revisiting the past in quest of understanding one's selfhood.

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[49] Alexei Chernyakov does not seek to "find" a philosophy of the person in the writings of the Holy Fathers. That would have meant a crude and unacceptable modernization. The object of search is rather the language in which one could express the "ontology of the human person". Following Lossky's "personality discourse" and being aware of the complexity of the hermeneutic work with "a large and unexplored text of philosophy" (which is the theology of the Eastern Fathers) the Petersburg philosopher seeks to reveal a concept of the person that would no longer be identical to the concept of the individual. Therefore the movement "from within Heidegger's philosophy" is not merely "the need for the language" of modern patristic study, but a reciprocal problem, the "need for each other". See: А.Г. Черняков, Хайдеггер и персонализм русского богословия, с. 140–141.